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Association Between Credit Rating Changes and
High-Tech M&A in Taiwan*

Jo-Hui Chen^
Chung Yuan Christian University

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the impact of high-tech and
non-high-tech mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on the credit rating changes in Taiwan. We
utilized the ordered probit model with random effect for the empirical works. A variety of
econometric tests were conducted using pooled data of 101 firms in Taiwan over the period
Sep. 1996 to Dec. 2001. This paper tries to examine whether the financial and strategy
factors affect the credit risks. Our results indicate that Insider Ownership and Leverage
Ratio are negatively related to credit rating changes, while Return on Equity and High-tech
Firm are positively related to credit rating changes for both pre- and post-M&A activities.
Although higher Institutional Ownership increases in credit rating changes for pre-M&A, it
decreases credit rating changes for post-M&A.

Introduction
During the 1990s, there were a number of changes in the competitive environment of
the high-technology industry in Taiwan due to deregulation. After joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Taiwan’s high-technology firms face more severe competition from
foreign competitors than from domestic ones. In particular, the foreign acquirers have
introduced technological advances and know-how to business with the globally-accepted
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practices and standards, that have successfully upgraded industrial restructuring, improved
management performance, eliminated inefficient corporations, and contributed to efficiency
gains, which helped the recovery of Asian economies from financial crisis. (Agami, 2002)
Technical innovation, technology transfer, and advanced information system have
contributed to increase efficiency by introducing new economies of scale into the
high-technology industry. To enrich profitability by providing more efficient service to
customers and by increasing the shareholders’ wealth, frequent takeovers within the
high-technology industry have been considered as one of the major strategies for reducing
the number o f competitors during the process of deregulation. To enhance market power
and utilize tax credits, many high-tech firms participated in takeovers targeting on the firms
whose assets are undervalued and have relatively low share prices. (Walker, 2000) As a
result, takeovers in related industry may facilitate the efficient redeployment of assets and
improve the operation performance of targeting firms in resolving financial distress.
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998)
However, high-tech targets associated with the inherent uncertainty of future
outcomes and the unproven nature of technological innovation may produce higher
likelihood of valuation risk for the acquirers than in the other takeover activities. The
acquirers tend to be suspicious about whether the benefits of value creation in this high-risk
acquisition can help them obtain a steady growth and offset the destructive impacts. To
reduce the skepticism of high-tech acquisitions, the acquirers needed to measure
continuously relative credit risk under an affordable cost. The credit rating agencies can
provide such accurate rank-orderings of the default risks in the credit evaluation process to
define investment prohibitions, to determine default probabilities, and to assist the acquirers
in assorting more carefully among targets. (Cantor and Packer, 1994) However, the major
determinants with respect to the empirical link between the wealth of acquirers and the
credit rating changes remain unknown.
This study aims to estimate the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the credit
rating changes for high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers in Taiwan. We hypothesize the
key determinants of pre- and post-M&A activities to increase the awareness of the acquirer’s
ability to create value and reduce default risks, and to provide more detailed information to
help investors distinguish more carefully among takeovers. We utilize the ordered probit
model with random effect for the empirical works. A variety of econometric tests are
conducted using a pooled data of cross-section and time-series for 101 firms of high-tech
and non-high-tech acquisitions in Taiwan over the period Sept. 1996 to Dec. 2001. This
study demonstrates the difference between high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers and
provides some unique empirical results for examining how financial factors (such as Return
on Equity, Cash Flow Return on Sales, Leverage Ratio, and Price-eamings Ratio) and
strategy factors (such as Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Market-to-book Ratio,
and Industrial Relatedness) affect the credit rating changes.
The important findings of this study show that high-tech acquisitions are more likely
to upgrade credit ratings than non-high-tech acquisitions. These results provide evidence
that credit rating changes depend heavily on the presence of Return on Equity, Insider
Ownership, and Leverage Ratio. While institutional investors play an important role in
increasing credit ratings for pre-M&A due to a strong capacity of targeting firms to meet
financial obligations, they found to decrease credit ratings because of pessimism of
managerial performance and default risks for post-M&A. We also found an inverse
relationship between Industrial Relatedness and credit ratings for post-M&A.
The evidence in this study sheds light on the determinants of the credit ratings for an
accurate assessment to alleviate the credit risks involved in the high-tech and non-high-tech
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acquisitions. This paper provides valuable information not only to improve investment
decisions for financial institutions and to reinforce the evaluation of loans for bankers, but
also to enhance the acquirer’s performance in takeover activities.

Review of Existing Literature
In finance literature, a considerable volume o f empirical studies on the wealth and
managerial performance effects of mergers and acquisitions has generally used financial
ratios analysis and abnormal returns to hypothesize whether there are gains available to the
stockholders of the acquirers and targets. Previous research has found somewhat mixed
results on the excess returns of the acquirers. According to the U.S. foreign acquisition
announcement, Doukas and Travlos (1988) provided empirical evidence to show that the
acquirers expanded a multinational network into a new industry across borders in order to
reduce institutional restrictions and to spread out country risks efficiently. Hence, these
acquirers may obtain greater value than those who have already operated in the target firm’s
country. In support of this position, Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) found
that foreign takeovers of the U.S. targets are likely to experience greater wealth gains than
domestic takeovers of the U.S. targets especially for the high-technology sector. Consistent
with the multinational-network hypothesis, Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) and Lyroudi,
Lazaridis and Subeniotis (1999) confirmed that the acquirers earn positive abnormal returns
by acquiring target firms in less developed countries and European countries. However,
inconsistent with the multinational network hypothesis, Dunne and Ndubizu (1995) found
that the acquirers operating in the U.S. market, who have an advantage of lower
coordination and monitoring cost and higher the efficiency in internal contracting process,
transfer more wealth to target shareholders than those already having a subsidiary in the U.S.
market. Yook and McCabe (1996) used a sample of 68 U.S. firms engaged in international
acquisitions to examine the wealth effects of acquiring firms’ shareholders. However, they
find no evidence to support the multinational-network hypothesis.
Some researchers have examined the post-merge performance of acquirers.
Regardless of the effects of pajonent method in cash or stock, Kohers and Kohers (2000)
showed that the acquirers of high-tech targets often experienced significant positive
abnormal returns to provide greater shareholder wealth benefits at the announcement date of
high-tech takeovers. They indicated that the moderate level of managerial ownership of
the acquirers, the larger size of transactions, and the lower institutional ownership of targets
have a positive effect on acquirers’ returns. To be consistent with the inefficient
management hypothesis, Palepu (1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) adjusted the financial
ratios for industry-specific distribution and found that the return on equity and leverage ratio
are negative and significant, suggesting that the shareholders’ wealth of the acquirers can be
accumulated by disciplinary actions taken against the inefficient managers of targets prior to
the acquisition. This conclusion was strengthened by the study of Ghosh and Lee (2000),
who examined whether disciplinary or non-disciplinary acquisitions generated higher
abnormal returns in terms of long-term earnings forecast revisions of target firms around
acquisition announcement dates. The results showed that the acquirers were likely to pay a
h i^ premium to obtain gains fi-om disciplinary actions when the managerial performance of
targeting firms performed poorly. Kohers and Kohers (2001) also reported that the
shareholders of acquirers respond favorably to high-tech takeover announcements in terms
of the creation of their wealth, but the long-run post-merger performance of acquirers was
poor if acquirers appeared to be related to a low book-to-market ratio, a low return on equity,
and a small managerial ownership with a high potential of agency problems.
In addition to reviewing the acquirers’ wealth effects of takeovers, some studies also
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extend this framework for investigating the relationship between the wealth and the rating
changes. Wansley, Elayan and Maris (1990), Goh and Ederington (1993) have examined
the reaction of common stock returns and preferred stock returns for the credit quality
placed on the rating agencies. They found a significant negative reaction to bond
downgrades because the rating agency attributes a fall in firm value to a decrease in earnings,
cash flow, or sales and by an increase in leverage, but no significant reaction to bond
upgrades. Ederington and Goh (1998) supported this view and found Granger causality
flows for both bond downgrades and earnings of the U.S. firms, but not for bond upgrades.
They showed that bond downgrades altered by the rating agency in reflecting the firm’s
financial difficulty tend to make financial analysts lower the firms’ earnings forecasts.
Lakshmi (1991) has used standard event study methodology to identify the impacts
of the stock price reactions to the risk of industrial straight debts, measured by their bond
ratings. Lakshmi found no evidence to show that the abnormal stock returns reaction of the
announcements of investment-grade and non-investment-grade debts were significantly
affected by the firms not involved in the takeovers. However, Billett (1996) and Goh and
Ederington (1999) contended that firms with low-rated speculative debt might experience
less likelihood of takeovers compared with those with an investment-grade debt because an
increase in leverage weakened an attraction of a disciplinary takeover.
Despite previous research on the association between the wealth effects of takeovers
and credit rating changes, factors influencing credit rating changes that are associated with
the distinct high-growth/high-risk profile of high-tech takeovers remain to be studied.

Ordered Probit Analysis of Credit Rating Changes in the Process of Takeover
We begin by specifying ordered probit as the estimation method for capturing the
relations between discrete-valued dependent variables and continuous-valued independent
variables. It is to be noted that the ordered probit models for pooled data were first
developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), and have been used in previous economics
and finance studies of bond ratings (see Kamstra, Keenedy and Suan, 2001; Badu and
Daniels, 1997; and Blume, Lim and McKinlay, 1998). The random effect estimates of both
methods use maximum likelihood functions and asymptotic standard errors to estimate the
model parameters that have essentially similar statistical characteristics. In principle, the
ordered probit models are derived from the normal probability distribution. (Greene, 1993).
The original specification for the ordered probit models with the random effects used
in this research took the following latent regression:
( 1)

where refers to an approximation of the unobserved measure of credit risk for the
acquirers involved in high-tech or non-high-tech acquisition. It is to be noted that is a
matrix of the independent variables for the acquirer i at time t and P' is a vector of the
estimated coefficients, s is the white-noise residual which is normalized to a meari of zero
and variance of one, where the group specific term,c7, , is distributed as7V(o,cr^ j. The
following numerous values of the dependent variable are observed:
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Here, r is the unknown “threshold” parameter defined as the range of the observed
dependent variable, , to be estimated along with parameter vector p .
represents an
approximation of the unobserved variable for credit ratings, . We assume that there are J
categories ordered from the lowest to the highest as 0<zi<z2<..... <zj-i. The probability
flmction ofl^^ has the form:

Prob(Yu=O)=0(-P'xu),
Proh(Yu=l)=0(zi-Pxu)- d>(-p'xtt),
prob(Yit=2) = 0 (zr P Xu)- 0(zi- /?' Xu),

(2)
(3)
(4)

Prob(Yu=J)=l-^(zj.i- P' Xu),

(5)

where 0 is the standard normal density.
Given the cross-section and time series of credit ratings, we estimate the ordered
probit with the random effect model as follows:

RATING^, = a,+ a^- PE, , + +a, •CASH. , +
+ a, ■ INST, , +

•MARKET, , +

■ ROE. , + a, •LEV. , +
•RELATED, , +

•INSIDER, ,

' HIGH, ,

(6)

where
refers to some unobserved measure of credit ratings. It is to be
noted that^",, and^. are the white-noise residual and group specific term, respectively. The
following six values of dependent variable of RATING,, are observed:

82

0 if RATINGl,<B

\ if B < RATlNGl < BB
2 if BB< RATlNGl ^
3 if BBB < RATING^ < A
4 if A<RATINGl<AA
5 if RATING], > AA
Table 1 details the number of credit rating changes for the high-tech and the
non-high-tech acquirers. We find the most notable differences between the two rating
categories. Most of the credit rating changes ranging from AAA to A for the high-tech
firms were superior to those ranging from A to BB for the non-high-tech firms. The recent
history of credit rating changes for high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers is shown in Table
2. Generally, the high-tech acquirers had a rating of BBB or higher, whereas the
non-high-tech acquirers were mostly in the range of BBB or lower. The high-tech
acquirers including United Microelectronics, Acer, Inventec, TSMC, Chroma Ate, Yageo,
ASE, Winbond, and Mosel Vitelic, and the non-high-tech acquirers such as WUS have
received the highest ratings (i.e., AAA) since 1996 (3Q). These firms were downgraded to
lower levels in the following quarters except for TSMC. However, the non-high-tech
acquirers such as Ruentex have received the lowest ratings. Ruentex experienced a
downward grading from BB to CCC during 1999 (3Q) to 2000 (4Q), the lowest rating ever
assigned to listed firms by Taiwan Corporate Credit Risks Index (TCRI). Lian Chen has
even declared bankruptcy due to its financial distress since 1999 (3Q).
Data
We selected our initial sample of 101 acquirers involving both domestic and foreign
mergers and acquisitions occurring between Sep. 1996 and Dec. 2001 as reported from
Economic Daily News in Taiwan.^ According to the special high-tech classification codes
provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), high-tech sectors included areas in
biotechnology, information technology, semi-conductor, communications, environmental
equipment, machinery, and pharmaceuticals, among others. Using the pooled quarterly
dataset, we separated high-tech and non-high-tech acquirers with the credit ratings in terms
of the effects of pre- and post-merger and acquisition activities.
Table 3 presents the definitions of the entire set of Taiwan Corporate Credit Risks
Index (TCRI) created by Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) in comparison with the credit
ratings of Standard & Poor (S&P) and Moody’s rating agencies. The proportions of credit
ratings in the seven categories (i.e. AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC by S&P and Aaa,
Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and C by Moody’s) are approximately the same. TEJ combined the
numerous credit risk indices into three major categories, investment-grade with lower risk
rating (1-4 degrees), medium risk rating (5-6 degrees), and speculative-grade with higher
risk rating (7-9 degrees). However, as a further check, the exact proportions of credit
^ We excluded 56 unlisted firms because the data were not available on the Taiwan Stock Exchange database,
and ruled out 16 listed firms due to the lack of credit ratings announced by Taiwan Economic Journal.
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ratings by TCRI according to the classification scheme used by TEJ has a sHght difference in
two categories of BB and B by S&P and Ba and B by Moody’s. The degree in credit rating
in these two categories can be expanded further to become four sub-categories in order to
match the different levels of descending financial performance or losses experienced by the
firms.
The definition and notation of credit ratings as the dependant variable are obtained
for each acquirer where data available fi-om TEJ are detailed in Table 4. To match the
classification scheme employed by S&P, we combined the degrees of 5 and 6 to BB level,
and narrowed the degrees o f 7 and 8 to BBB level of the credit rating categories, RATINQ
for high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers. We defined the threshold values ranging from 0
to 5 in order to symbolize an ascending rating of B or below, BB, BBB, A, AA, and AAA,
respectively. On the basis of relevant literature, the data for the independent variables
grouped into two categories— financial factors and strategy factors, were taken fi’om TEJ
database to study how the credit ratings were influenced.
The first category reflects the financial factors including Leverage Ratio (LEV),
Cash Flow Returns on Sales (CASH), Return on Equity (ROE), and Price-eamings Ratio
(PE). An increase in PE of the acquirer may enhance wealth gains from the acquisition of
lower PE targets. Hence, the market tended to reevaluate the combined firms’ value
according to the acquirer’s original high PE ratio, thus leading to a lower default risk (Cudd
and Duggal, 2000). Therefore, one may expect a positive relationship between PE and
credit ratings.
It is hypothesized that CASH has an important effect on credit quality. When
CASH increases, the credit ratings may be upgraded because the amount of operating cash
flow available to the acquirers accelerates business expansions. This may encourage
takeovers and improve the acquirers’ operation performance to strengthen their financial
conditions (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998). We expect CASH to be positively related to
the credit ratings for the acquirers involved in high-tech and non-high-tech acquisitions.
We employ ROE to capture the effect of the acquirer’s long-run performance for
high-tech and non-high-tech acquisitions on the credit risk. Kohers and Kohers (2000)
found that ROE seems to have a relatively strong impact on high-tech acquirers in
reinforcing market’s confidence with respect to the acquirer’s ability to create wealth gains
in the high-risk deals. Thus, the higher ROE as a managerial entrenchment motive is
expected to increase the credit rating.
Palepu (1986) and Song and Walkling (1993) found a negative relationship between
financial leverage and takeover likelihood that suffered a decline in value. These findings
are consistent with our view that the larger the acquirer’s LEV, the greater the market’s
concerns on the acquirer’s ability to fiilfill its financial obligations corresponding to a higher
risk o f default through the downgrade of credit rating.
The second category reflects strategy factors consisting of Insider Ownership
(INSIDER), Institutional Ownership (INST), Market-to-book Ratio (MARKET), and the
Industrial Relatedness (RELATED) of the acquisition. To examine the role played by the
agency problem in the high-tech and non-high-tech takeovers, we assumed that INSIDER
which proxied for management quality, equals to 1 if the total insider ownership exceeds 15
percent, and 0 otherwise.^ Song and Walkling (1993) and Kohers and Kohers (2000)
revealed that increasing management quality has an effect on the acquirer’s abnormal returns
at the high-tech merger announcement date in alleviating agency problem when managers
are in alignment with owners of the company. Additionally, Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994)
^ See Yook and McCabe, 1996.
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suggested that increased managerial ownership, as an agency-conflict-mitigating device, was
more prone to reduce the role of debt in order to minimize capital structure risks. Thus, we
expect that an increasing Insider Ownership can be positively related to credit ratings
because less agency problem signaling better quality management may improve the firm’s
financial prospects and lower default risks.
A dummy variable for INST is expected to be a major determinant of credit rating
changes for takeovers. Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994) and Cebenoyan, Cooperman and
Register (1999) recognized that institutional investors have played a significant role as
external effective monitors and have made proxy fights to restrain management behavior of
myopic managers. With higher levels of INST and better external monitoring, the
“Prudent-man Hypothesis”, firms may experience less debt leverage associated with lower
level of default risk.^ Thus, the acquirers with the existence of a greater INST are expected
to have upgraded credit rating because of a strong capacity to meet their financial
commitments.
We utilize MARKET to be a proxy for measuring the presence of asymmetric
information of the acquirers. If the acquirer experiences a high MARKET, it may reflect a
high potential of asymmetric information related to favorable future earnings opportunities
according to the market-to-book hypothesis (Emery and Switzer, 1999). To generate the
wealth for shareholders and increase the firm’s credit quality, managers, who own a large
proportion of the acquirer’s shares, may be motivated by a realized growth opportunities and
an enhanced managerial performance."^ Hence, one may expect a positive relationship
between MARKET and credit ratings. Another factor influencing the acquirer’s strategy is
industrial relatedness of the acquisition.
Doukas and Travlos (1988) found that
multinational firms expanded into the unrelated industries at new foreign locations may
experience a high wealth gain for their shareholders. However, to determine the value of
an acquisition, Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) found that Industrial Relatedness to the
acquirer’s core business is positively associated with its abnormal returns. We included
Industrial Relatedness, RELATED, as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and
target have the same two-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise. Our reasoning is that industrial
relatedness as a measure of synergistic gains reduces credit risks when there is a close
relationship between the acquirers and targets.
In addition to the financial and strategy factors, Kohers and Kohers (2000) and Ang
(2000 ) examined the role of high-tech acquirers in affecting shareholders’ wealth and
choosing payment contract. They found that the abnormal returns and the tendency to
select deferred payment would be higher for high-tech acquirers than for non-high-tech
acquirers. The hypothesis is that, regardless of the inherent uncertainty of cash flow and
technological innovation, if the market recognizes the potential synergies of high-tech
takeovers as a means to increase growth potential, enhance technological advancements,
offer job growth creation, provide efficiency gains, and improved shareholder’s wealth, the
credit rating should be viewed positively by the rating agency.
E m p ir ic a l R e su lts

The results obtained by the ordered probit with random effect model for examining
the determinants of pre- and post-M&A activities are shown in Table 5. As can be seen.
^ To obtain a better monitoring of management performance, Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1999)
developed the Prudent-man Hypothesis to predict a negative relation between institutional investor ownership
and risk measures.
Walkling (2000) used the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the Tobin’s q ratio to measure managerial
performance.
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there are three columns for the obtained estimates. The credit rating changes for M&A
activities are in columns (I), while the estimated results used to analyze pre-M&A and
post-M&A activities are detailed in column (II) and (III), respectively. To test the overall
explanatory power of the model, we performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test to examine the
group specific heterogeneity in Table 5. The LR test of the null hypothesis of a fixed
constant in the probability function versus the alternative hypothesis of a random draw from
the normal distribution yielded statistics of 249.106, 332.838, and 315.308 for the three
columns. The critical value of the statistic is;jf^(0.01,l) = 6.64, indicating that we reject
the null hypothesis and accept the random effect for the estimations. The fmdings for the
threshold values, as shown by BB-BBB, BBB-A, A-AA, and AA-AAA, are all strongly
sigmficant, indicating that categorizing credit ratings with uneven spacing intervals are
evidently appropriate and defmable.
To start with, the results of the statistical significance of the determinants explaining
the probability of credit rating changes for both pre-M&A and post-M&A are unique. Our
findings suggest that Taiwanese high-tech acquirers wishing to preserve their credit ratings
should seek to acquire firms v^th fmancial and strategy factors. We found that the
coefficients relating to LEV, ROE and High-Tech (HIGH) are significant in all three
columns. The results support the view that a higher ROE and a lower LEV are likely to
increase the probability of higher credit ratings. This finding suggests that ROE, which
represents a managerial entrenchment motive, would create an anticipation of the acquirer's
ability to create greater wealth so as to increase the probability of upgrading credit ratings
for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities. On the other hand, a larger LEV viewed
unfavorably in terms of greater debt burden corresponding to a higher default risk, is likely
to downgrade credit ratings. Note that the negative impact of LEV on credit rating changes
for post-M&A is greater than that for pre-M&A, suggesting that the market reacts worriedly
about the acquirers suffering a change in financial burden via bridge loans and increasing
operational costs after M&A.
In addition, the finding supports our expectation that the high-tech acquirers do
receive relatively a greater probability to have a higher credit rating when compared v^th
non-high-tech acquirers, as shown by HIGH, which is positive and significant at the 0.01
level in all three columns.
In particular, the results show that the distinct
high-growth/high-risk profile of high-tech acquirers for post-M&A activity in column (El)
are likely to obtain a significantly higher credit rating than for pre-M&A activity in column
(H).
Unexpectedly, the estimates of the dummy variable, INSIDER, indicate a strong
negative influence on the credit rating changes for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities.
This finding does not support the notion that, to alleviate agency problem, excessive
management quality would minimize default risks and upgrade credit ratings. One reason
may be that excessive managerial ownership may be associated with strong management
entrenchment and augmented debt financing, and thus having adverse consequences for
financial performance and negative impact on credit risks.
As for the effects of ownership structure, the result reveals a positive and statistically
significant impact of INST on credit rating changes for pre-M&A activity in column (II).
Moreover, Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994), Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register (1999), and
Kohers and Kohers (2001) reported similar results. They noted that the greater the INST
serving as an effective monitor, the lower the levels of firms’ debt leverage would be. As
INST increases, the probability of poor acquisition decisions made by acquiring-firm
managers may reduce. For the post-M&A activity in column (III), a negative and
statistically significant relationship is evident. This echoes the earlier findings of Kohers
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and Kohers (2000), the negative coefficient for the dummy variable, INST, suggests that a
higher INST is likely to be associated with lower credit rating for acquirers. Institutional
investors tended to be skeptical about their assessments of takeover decisions and become
dissatisfied with managerial performance due to the inherent uncertainty of technological
innovations, cultural conflicts, the lack of cash flow, and less ability to reduce the debt
leverage, contributing unique risks in financial distress.
The results strongly suggest that the Industrial Relatedness (RELATED) o f the
acquisition has a negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of credit
rating changes in column (I). This implies an inverse relationship between synergistic
gains and credit ratings. This is not surprising since the acquirers often overestimated the
economies of scale or synergy gains of a merger and acquisition. These problems lead to
the recognition that the acquirers may face weakening financial performance if targeting
firms operate in the same two-digit SIC, thus increasing credit risks. (Burand, 1999)
We found that the financial variables such as MARKET, PE, and CASH show poor
results. This suggests that for both pre-M&A and post-M&A activities, financial ratios are
not important in explaining the probability of credit rating changes for high-tech and
non-high-tech acquirers.
C o n clu sio n

This paper investigates the determinants of credit rating changes for both pre-M&A
and post-M&A activities. This study employs the ordered probit model with random
effects to compare acquirers’ ability to create value for high-tech and non-high-tech
acquisitions.
The results suggest that a higher ROE and a lower LEV are likely to increase the
probability of higher credit ratings. The positive coefficient for HIGH supports the notion
that acquirers are likely to receive higher credit ratings when compared with takeovers
involving non-high-tech acquirers. However, high levels of management quality would not
minimize default risks owing to the problems of strong management entrenchment and
augmented debt financing.
The coefficient for INST is significant and positive for the ordered probit equation
for pre-M&A activity, but significant and negative for the post-M&A activity. This
suggests that institutional investors tended to be pessimistic about their assessments of
takeover decisions and dissatisfied with managerial performance. This would result in
greater fmancial default risk and downgraded credit ratings. We also found an inverse
relationship between industrial relatedness and credit ratings because the acquirers often
overestimated the economies of scale or synergy gains of M&A.
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Table I
Credit Rating Changes

Rating

High-Tech Acquirers

AAA
AA
A
BBB
BE
B
CCC
Total

9
7
9
7
5

Non-High-Tech
Acquirers
1

5

All Acquirers
10
12

9

17
17
14

1
0

1
1

2
1

38

35

73

8
10
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Table II
Recent History of Credit Rating Changes
High-Tech Acquirers
Products

Company
United Microelectronics Corp.

Accton Technology Corp.

Acer Inc.

Mitac International Corp.

Inventec Corp.

Semiconductor

Web Equipments

Computer

Computer

Notebook Computer

Ratings

Effective Date

AA A

1996 (3Q)

A

1999 (3Q)

AA

2000 (4Q)

A

1996 (3Q)

BB

1999 (3Q)

AAA

1996 (3Q)

AA

1999 (3Q)

BBB

1996 (3Q)

A

1999 (IQ )

AAA

1996 (4Q)

AA

1998 (IQ )

TSMC Technology Corp.

Semiconductor

AA A

1996 (3Q)

Chroma Ate Inc.

Testing Instruments

AA A

1996 (4Q)

BBB

2000 (3Q)

BBB

1996 (3Q)

A

1997 (4Q)

AA

1999 (3Q)

A

2000 (3Q)

AA

1999 (IQ )

AAA

1996 (4Q)

A

1999 (3Q)

AA A

1996 (3Q)

AA

1999 (3Q)

AAA

1996 (3Q)

A

1997 (3Q)

BB

1997 (4Q)

BBB

1998 (3Q)

A

2000 (3Q)

AA A

1996 (3Q)

A

1997 (3Q)

BBB

1997 (4Q)

BB

1998 (3Q)

B

1999 (3Q)

BBB

1996 (4Q)

BB

1997 (4Q)

AA
BBB
BB

1996 (3Q)
1999 (IQ )
1999 (3 0 )

Ritek Corp.

Storage Media

Via Technologies Inc.

Processors

Yageo Corp.

Passive Component

A SE Inc.
Winbond Electronics Corp.

M osel Vitelic Inc.

Solomon Technology Corp.
Orient Semiconductor Electronics
Co. Ltd,

IC
IC

DRAM

Semiconductor
Semiconductor
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Table U
(continued)
Non-High-Tech Acquires
Products

Company
WUS Group Holding Co., Ltd

Ruentex Corp.

Electronics Parts

Textile

Ratings

Effective Date

AAA

1996 (3Q)

A

1999 (3Q)

BBB

2000 (3Q)

BB

1996 (3Q)

BBB

1997 (4Q)

BB

1999 (3Q)

B

2000 (IQ )

CCC

2000 (4Q)

Uni-President Enterprise Co.

Food

AA

1996 (3Q)

Taisun Enterprise Corp.

Food

BBB

1996 (3Q)

BB

1997 (2Q)

BBB

1996 (3Q)

A

1997 (IQ )

AA

1997 (4Q)

BBB

1999 (IQ )

BB

1999 (3Q)

A

1996 (3Q)

AA

1997 (3Q)

BBB

1997 (2Q)

BB

1997 (4Q)

(a)

1999 (3Q)

A

1996 (3Q)

BB

1997 (3Q)

BBB

2000 (3Q)

A

1998 (3Q)

BBB

1999 (3Q)

BB

1996 (3Q)

BBB

1997 (3Q)

A

1997 (4Q)

BBB

1999 (3Q)

A

1999 (4Q)

AA

1996 (3Q)

A

1999 (IQ )

BB

1999 (4Q)

AA

1996 (3Q)

BB

1998 (IQ )

Yulon Motor Co., Ltd.

Automobile

Sanyo Textile Co.

Textile

Hog Tai Electric Industrial Co., Electric Cable
Ltd.
Lian Chen Food Co.

Food

Chung Hwa Pulp Corp.

Pulp

Electrical Products

Potrans Electrical Corp.

Storage Products

CMC Magnetics Corp.

China Synthetic Rubber Corp.

Shoe

Pouchen Group
Tait

Marketing

Rubber

&

Distribution Service

Corp.

Note:

(a) denoted “Bankruptcy”.
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Table III
The Definitions of Credit Ratings for Standard & Poor, Moody’s,
and TCRI Agencies.
Credit Ratings
TCRI

S&P

Moody’s

1

AAA

Aaa

2

AA

Aa

3

4

A

BBB

A

Baa

5
BB

Ba

B

B

6

7
8

9

CCC

C

Definitions
Extremely strong capacity to meet its financial
commitments.
Very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments.
Strong (Satisfactory) capacity to meet its financial
commitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the
adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic
conditions than debt in higher-rated categories.
Adequate capacity to meet its financial commitment, but
adverse economic and financial conditions more likely to
weaken capacity. Lowest Investment-grade rating.
Any debt rated BB for long-term (or B for short-term) or
below is regarded as having significant speculative
characteristics. Debt has less near-term vulnerability to
default than other speculative issues. However, it faces
major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse
business, financial, or economic conditions that could lead
to inadequate capacity.
Greater vulnerability to default but still has the capacity to
meet its financial commitments. Adverse business,
financial, or economic conditions will likely impair
capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitments.
An obligor is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to
meet its financial commitments.

Source:

(1) Creditweek, Standard & Poor’s Service.
(2) Money Watching & Credit Rating, a Bi-Monthly Review, Taiwan Economic Journal.
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Table IV
List of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable

Notation

Credit Rating

RATING

Price-eamings Ratio

PE

Cash Flow Return on

CASH

Sales
Return on Equity

ROE

Leverage Ratio

LEV

Insider Ownership

INSIDER

Listitutional Ownership

INST

Market-to-book Ratio

MARKET

Lidustrial Relatedness

RELATED

High-Tech Firm

HIGH

Definition
The credit risk index:
0 = B or below, 1 = BB, 2 = BBB, 3 = A,
4= A A ,an d5= A A A .
The PE ratio is the ratio of the acquirer’s market
price per share to its earnings per share.
The pretax operating cash flow return on sales are
measured as earnings before interest, taxes and
depreciation (EBITDA) deflated by sales.
ROE is earnings after tax as a proportion of the
book value of equity.
The Leverage Ratio is defined as the ratio of
long-term debt to total equity.
INSIDER is a proxy variable for management
quality that is 1 if total insider ownership exceeds
15 percent, and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable for Institutional Ownership
that is 1 if the percentage of equity held by
institutional investors exceeds 20 percent, and 0
otherwise.
The Market-to-book Ratio is calculated by the
market value of common equity to the book value
of common equity.
The Industrial Relatedness of the acquisition
equals to 1 if the acquirer and target have the
same two-digit SIC and zero otherwise.
A dummy variable for high-tech firms. If
HIGH= 1, the acquirer was from a high-tech
industries; 0 otherwise.
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Table V
Ordered Probit with Random Effect of Merger and Acquisition

Notation

Regressor

Constant

Constant

M &A

Pre- M & A

Post- M & A

I

II

III

3.351

4.120

3.870

(11.54)**

(9.81)**

-0001

-0.001

-0.001

(-0.19)

(-0.74)

(-0.54)

0.056

0.088

0.140

(0.52)

(0.57)

(0.90)

0.016

0.020

0.021

(2.88)**

(3.32)**

(3.57)**

-1.754

-2.412

-3.156

(-8.47)**

(-8.32)**

(-8.71)**

0.336

-0.771

-0.738

(1.30)

(-4.75)**

(-4.19)**

-0.653

0.465

-0.662

(-2.95)**

(2.91)**

(-2.77)**

(14.62)**

Price-eamings

PE

Ratio
Cash Flow

CASH

Return on Sales
Return on Equity

ROE

Leverage Ratio

LEV

Insider Ownership

INSIDER

Institutional

INST

Ownership
Market-to-book

MARKET

Ratio
Industrial Relatedness

RELATED

High-Tech Firm

HIGH

1

0.004

0.006

0.007

(0.14)

(0.22)

(0.24)

-0.895

-0.141

(-10.52)**

(-0.66)

1.303

0.0783

2.162

(5.92)**

(4.83)**

(8.01)**

2.143

2.847

2.806

(18.72)**

(14.13)**

(9.10)**

Thresholds
BB - BBB
B B B -A
A ‘ AA
AA—AAA

2.938

3.715

3.699

(21.22)**

(17.02)**

(11.63)**

3.704

4.590

4.620

(30.121)**

(21.35)**

(13.91)**

5.212

6.380

6.430

(36.44)**

(26.48)**

(19.15)**

249.106

332.838

315.308

1.135

1.748

1.366

(11.59)**

(17.34)**

(17.04)**

Measure o f Fit
Likelihood Ratio Test
Standard Deviation
N ote:

1.
2.

t-statistics is in Parentheses.
** indicates significance at the 5 per cent levels o f the two-tail test.
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